The Clyde Hill Board of Adjustments recently ruled in favor of former Mariner First Baseman, John Olerud and his wife Kelly, in the first action brought under the City of Clyde Hill’s View Obstruction and Tree Removal Ordinance (CHMC Chapter 17.38). In that action, the Oleruds asked the City to enforce the view protection ordinance which required their neighbors, who owned a rare fifty year old and fifty foot high Chinese red pine, as well as a fifty foot fir tree. The trees block what has been described by Olerud as 40% of a 30 degree view of Lake Washington, Seattle and the Olympics from his home. The Clyde Hill Board of Adjusters ruled, in a 3-2 vote, that the two trees “unreasonably block the view” of the Oleruds, and ordered the removal of the tress. The Oleruds were ordered to pay the cost of the tree removal and the cost to replace the trees with smaller trees, which total price tag was not trivial ($62,694). The neighbors were also ordered to trim the replacement trees if they grew to 25 feet.

For those of you unacquainted with this Seattle metropolitan suburban city, it is a very well heeled community nestled on a gently sloping hill between the enclave of Medina and Bellevue, a short walk from the shopping mecca of Bellevue Square. It is almost entirely residential, and many of the homes have beautiful lake views oriented to the western sunsets. Given the wealth of the community, it’s not surprising that its residents can afford lawyers, and may well be used to getting their way. Apparently this law, which has been on the books for decades, had never before required a ruling from the City. Prior property owners were able to resolve their differences privately. Perhaps taking a page out of the Congressional playbook, these neighbors couldn’t reach a compromise. (more…)

Division Three of the Washington Court of Appeals recently considered how far a court could go to force a property owner to clean up his personal property after a non-judicial foreclosure. The Court’s answer is that inherent in the Court’s power to order the restitution of possession of property to the winning bidder at a trustee’s sale is the power to force the owner to clean up his mess or take steps to sell or dispose of the property.

In the case of Excelsior Mortgage Equity Fund II, LLC v. Schroeder, (No. 30333-1-III), the lender had conducted a trustee sale in February 2010 of some 200 acres of ranchland in Stevens County. The ranch was littered with hundreds of vehicles, bicycles, and parts of both, as well as cattle. While RCW 61.24.010(1) provides that the successful bidder is entitled to possession of a foreclosed property twenty days after the trustee’s sale, the bank extended the time for the owner to remove his personal property from the land. Finally, at the end of April, 2010, the bank brought an unlawful detainer action under RCW 59.12 against the former landowner. It wasn’t until December 2010 that the Court granted a judgment of unlawful detainer and provided that a writ of restitution should be issued to the sheriff to deliver possession of the land to the bank.

Thereafter, the bank brought a motion to enlist the Court’s authority to help it clear the land of the borrower’s property. Because the borrower wasn’t living on the land, the normal writ of restitution function of “dispossessing” the occupants wasn’t at issue. The bank needed to get the property of the borrower off the land. The bank asked the court to fashion a process similar to the process in the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act (RCW 59.18) allowing a certain time period for removal of the property, and if not so removed, then to allow the sale and/or disposal of the property. The borrower resisted the process, because the unlawful detainer statute for this commercial property did not provide any such procedure. (more…)

Lauer v. Pierce County, 157 Wash. App. 693, 238 P3d 539 (2010) involved a county hearings examiner grant of a fish and wildlife variance to allow for the construction of a home in a stream buffer zone.  A neighbor challenged the decision successfully in the trial court.  The applicants appealed, contending that their rights vested in 2004 when they first filed a completed building permit application.

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In Mellish v. Frog Mountain Pet Care, the Washington Supreme Court considered the effect of Mellish’s motion for reconsideration by the hearings examiner of his decision to approve a conditional use permit and variance to expand Frog Mountain, a dog and cat boarding facility.  The original decision was made on June 18, 2007.  The local code allowed an opponent to file such motion without providing notice to the applicant.  The hearings examiner considered the motion and again approved the application.  The decision on the motion for reconsideration before the hearings examiner was made on July 20, 2007. (more…)